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REBUTTAL STATE! EUT ?^S,-B¥-THE^OSECUTION AT THE CICSING '
OF CASE HO. XI ON l8 NOVEi^!BER IPUS
•1 For more than six days defense counsel have been engaged in
delivering closing arguments to the Tribunal. Undoubtedly the
prosecution does not stand alone in feeling that there has been
much able arguiuent offered by learned counsel for the defense.
But after studying the closing arguments of the defense^ we find
no reason to modify or to supplement in any substantial way tlie
arguments we made in our closing statement of 9 November. With
your permission we will reply briefly to a few matters raised by the
defense in ihe last week. Our total time for closing, rebuttal
included, will amount to approximately the full day originally
allowed us for final argument. We to-II give some attention to some
of the most fundamental legal arguments of the defense and some
emphasis, by several examples, to Y;hat vre believe to be distortions,
probably arising as a result of understandable zeal on the part of
defense counsel. We suggest that most of the analogies drawn by
defense counsel do not pay sufficient attention to such important
elements as the full facts, the context of a sentence, the context in
which events transpired, the dates, the times, the places and the
order of events. The defense in its closing arguments have made an
♦
all-out attack on the basic moral and legal principles which underlie
the charges in ihis Indictment.
Counsel for the defendant KOERNER spearheaded this attack. His
point of attack is'that conditions have changed since the BIT
rendered its judgment in the pall of l^U^. Therefore, Dr. Koch
concludes on page 3 Koerner closing:
"This honorable Tribunal mil have to deal vdth the new
law v.hich has meanwhile come into being."
And again at page 6 this same counsel states:
"The happenings of the last year adequately illustrate
the extent and speed with which the vrorld is changing,
and it is the natural duty of the Tribunal to adjust
itself to these changes and to verify the true contents
of international law at the time judgment is passed."
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Notj-j rrhat are the true contents of international law to which the
defendants ask this Tribunal to conform? As to the Crimes against
Peace, the defense says: 'nTe have no alternative but to affirm the
legal status prevailing today that aggressive wars are not criminal,
or at least that they no longer are." (KOERNER Plea, p.lii.)#
As to spoliation charges of liTar Crimes and Grimes against
Humanity, the defense remind us that this is the first time,
since the SIT, that "the total economic process of the utilization
of territories ocoupied by Germany is to be judged." (KOERHER
Plea, p.2h)* They point out that the other cases at Nurnberg were
individual cases of private industrialists vdio had private interests,
7/hereas here we deal with the high government officials engaged in
vhat they term "the total economic process" of the utilization by
Germany of occupied territory. We agree with the defense that this
case affords a distinction betv/een government officials and private
industrialists, but Yre see no comfort in this distinction for these
defendants•
What is the new international law which they ask this Tribunal
to pronounce on the law of belligerent occupancy? The defense
argues that modem total war has made the prohibitions of the Hague
Rules obsolete and that under the "new" international law "ary
considerations for the individual, the non-combatant, as well as •ttie
combatant, recede into the background," (KOERNTilR Plea, p.28).
As to the "new" international law on slave labor, the defense
says: (KOERHSR Plea, p.36)
"This Tribunal vYould make an important contribution to
the future development of international law, if it were
to repudiate, on legal grounds, any conviction on the
charge of forced labor. There is a great difference
between regarding forced labor as abominable on
humanitarian grounds and being permitted to punish it
on legal grounds."
This "nsYf" international law urged by the defense runs in opposite
directions at the same time. This is well illustrated by their
arguments on the law v/ith respect to aggressive vrar as compared with
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the law limiting conduct during a belligerent occupation, Tfith
respect to aggressive war, the defense argues that the outlawry war
as an instrument of national policy came too late to offer a basis
for the punishment of aggressors. Here the contention is made that
international laYf v/ith respect to Crimes against the Peace
crj'-stallizGd and took form too late to establish standards by which
these, defendants may be judged. Howeverj when we come to the
charges involving spoliation and slave labor^ ive find the defense
makes an about face. Here they claim that international lawj as
codified in the Geneva and Hague Conventions^ is too old and that
the crystallization of the principles of the conventions is completely
unfitting for the modem vforld. Hence, they say that these
conventions are out of date as a guide in determining whether these
defendants committed crime. Of course, the defense is again merely
saying that there is no enforceable international law, and that
anarcl:^ alone prevails when nations come into conflict#
CRUES AGAINST PEACE
During "the last week we have heard the defense argue "that in
spite of the London Charter, Control Council Law No#10, the HIT
judgment and other Kurnberg decisions, aggressive war is not really
a crime at all. This Tribunal, in effect, is asked to accept "this
challenge to its jurisdiction and to declare that the most basic
part of the law establishing the jurisdiction of this Tribunal
should be declared null and void. Such argument is not new to this
Trib\mal, Motions and extensive memoranda were filed by the defense
during the course of the trial, attacking the jurisdiction of the
Tribunal# Needless to say, after due consideration, the defense
motions were denied in each instance# The defense gave a somewhat
strange twist to an old argument by another assertion# They claim
that even if aggressive war v/ere cognizable as a crime in X9hS v^hen
the London Agreement was signed, it is no longer a crime because of
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developments in the relations betr/een nations since 19h$» Of coursej
these and related arguments have been made to other Tribunals in
Nurnberg vrith no effeot.. Less iiian. a month ago Tribuml NotlV in
its judgment in Case No,XI reaffimed that aggressive vrar "i^as the
supreme crime in international law« However, last vreek counsel for
the defendant KOERI^IER said: "YJho is still going to maintain today
that aggressive vrarfare is prohibited? o.o Even had aggressive warfare
been banned at the time the ILIT Judgment was passed, this is
certainly not tiie case today by virtue of the general usage practised
by the community of nations since the IHT Judgment was passed,
novihere throughout the wide vforld has ;bhe attempt been made to
'4
prosecute any person guilty of one of the crimes established as
for punishment
liable/by the Charter and Control Council Law No.lO ... The Il:t,
f
v/hich described him (Goering) as the driving force behind wars of
aggression, is completely mistaken. If there was aryonc who was
against all v.^ars, and again and again vrorked for peace, it appears
to have been Goering ,,. Propinquity to Goering does not argue in
favor of readiness for war but readiness for peace." No doubt there
"vidll be further efforts by some to make Goering appear to be the
-P true Prince of peace. As Dr. Koch was making these statements before
^ this Tribunal last week, the International plilitary Tribunal for the
Far East, composed of Judges from many nations, was pronouncing
* Judgment that certain indicted Japanese leaders were guilty of Crimes
against Peace as well as guilty of a conspiracy to commit Crimes
against Peace.
The defense, however, remind us of the political situation
existing in the world- today, and in cavalier fashion they parade before
our eyes some of the problems Yrhich are now before the United Nations,
The defense asserts that the fact of the existence of political
disputes and civil vrar is proof that today aggressive vra.r is permissible.
This is curious reasoning, indeed. The existence of strife and civil
Tfar in certain areas of the international community is proof, the defense
argues, tliat there is no lavi in the international community, not\'athstandin£
Tr V;.
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jthe fact that efforts are being raade to resolve the political disputes
b^-means other than the resort to arms. This Tribunal is hardly in
a position to consider "tiie legal aspects of these political disputes.
But even if these disputes may involve violations of international
law, the point of the defense is not well taken. To be consistent
the defense v/ould have to maintain that there is no municipal
criminal law, for they could just as well point to the calendar
before any criminal court in anj*" cpuntry to show that the law is
being violated every day in the domestic field. 'Te hardly believe
the defense would make that analogy or that they would be so rash
as to argue that because all the violators of local criminal
standards have not been brought to justice, that this indicates
the absence of standards to which the individual is bound to adhere.
ITe suggest that the principles relating to individual
responsibility for Crimes against Peace, principles painfully
evolved through past decades, do not lose their validity because
today questions of infringement of the peace are being presented in
world councils. On the contrary, every reason is thereby given
for a resounding affirmation of the basic rule that aggressive war
nay not bo used as an instrument of national policy without individual
criminal responsibility,
trhat the defense contends is that a state today has the right,
Tiathout any restrictions at all, to be the sole judge of when to
launch a war of aggression. To test the application of the defense
contention in the light of the facts doveloped here in Nurnberg,
the defense are inviting a situation whore the high officials of
any government might say vrLth impunity:
"Wc shall engulf State there is of course no question
of sparing state Bj since ve shall establish a principle
of national and racial supremacy, v/e must for that purpose
take over States C, D or Ej and resettle or exterminate
the inhabitants of those states for the purification
of our "master"' race. These are our war aims and as a
matter of military necessity v/e will deport the civilian
population of countrios we occupy to work for us as our
slaves, and we v/ill use the economy of tho countries
we occupy for our military econony,"
-.5
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This legal argument of the defense is not surprising, for it is the
only vmy these defendants can hope to exculpate themselves from
responsibility. Such legal theories could lead us to overlook the
facts. The experience of the last %7ar, how it was planned,
prepared, initiated and vragod, cannot bo so lightly brushed aside.
In our brief entitled "Legal Principles Applicable to Crimes
against peace", vre have called attention to the analysis by
Professor Goodhart in the International Lavr Quarterly, a British
publication (Winter, IShl9 Po5U5)* Professor Goodhart said;
"We must not forget that belief that certain acts
are criminal has always had a compelling influence
on the actions of people because there is an inherent
tendency, to be law-abiding. The enforcement of law
follows on the recognition of law. py driving home
the lesson that aggressive war is a crime, the Nurnberg
trials havo^mado it less easy for a fanatic to lead
his people into such an adventure^"
We conclude this part of the discussion by referring to the
analysis of Professor Jessup, now the deputy delegate of the United
otates to the United Nations. In v^riting on the subject, "The
Crime of Aggression and the Future of International Law", this
learned authority states (62 Political Science Quarterly, 1, 1;)-
"Inaction by the whole society of nations from now on
would constitute a repudiation of the precedent with
the consequenco that the last state of the world would
bo worse than the first.. It would constitute an
assertion that aggressive war is not a crime and that
the individual who vras guilty of endangering the
international public repose is not to be treated as
criminal."
LOTTATIONS ON EELLIGSRENT OCCUPATION
The closing statements on behalf of the defendants KGERKHIR,
PLEIGER and KEHRL offer a proper sampling of the extended arguments
of the defense on the lavf concerning the charges of spoliation and
slave labor. These arguments run to the effect that because of the
very nature of modem v^ar the historic limitations of belligerency
are voidj all considerations of humanity fade out of the picture
when the belligerent invokes the magic words "military necessity '^j
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there are no limits upon the requirements of military necessity except
those which the bclligerGnt may choose to impose upon himselfj
everything is permissible in doalirg "VYitli the economy or the manpo\YGr
of the occupied wbi?h bas any relation to the rail.itary
economj'" of the oocopan-'-; briefly^ the territory occupied during
vfar and the human beings who l.ive in occupied t.orrito:ry beocme an
integral part of the economic sphere of mho occupant with which he
may do as he chooses j the title of tlie ormers of property may be
divested at will by the belligerent and its value later debited to
"the loser" of the vrar Then the treaty is drav/nj vrar is the most
ruthless of all human business and it is absurd for society to
atten^t to enforce any limitations upon its conduct.
To this kind of argumentation we can provide no better reply
than has been made by the Krupp Tribunal (Opinion and Judgment,
Case No^tE5,j pp,17~l8);
the contention that the rules and customs of
warfare can be violated if either party is hard
pressed in v/ar must-be rejected on other grounds.
Tar is by definition a rislcj'" and hazardous business •••
It is an essence of war tliat one or the other side must
lose and the experienced generals and statesmen knew
this when they drafted the rules and customs of land
v/arfare. In short these rules and customs of v-rarfare
are designed specifically for all phases of war. They
comprise the lavf for such emergency. To claim that they
can be wantonly — and at the sole discretion of any one
belligerent — disregarded when he considers his ovm
situation to bo critical, means nothing more or less
than to abrogate the laws and customs of war entirely."
*Te hear the further argument that the Allies during the post-war
occupation have adopted the principles and the methods of Kazi
Germany, in one respect or the other, and thorefore no Tribunal
consisting of members of one or more of the AHiod powers can
properly declare that individual Germans arc guilty of violations
of international law. Similarly, it is argued that the Allies have
cast assunder the principles of the Hague and Geneva Conventions by
their conduct after Germany's defeat,. Here again the process of
apology and rationalization goes all the way to reductio ad absurdum.
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On the basis of these arguments, the defense dec3a res that neither
this nor any other Tribunal can properly dravr distinctions ivith
respect to the permissible conduct of a belligerent occupants This
argument has been repeated again and again, in other cases quite as
well as this one - and frcra the decision of the B-iT onivards, no
Tribunal has given any support to such assertions. Wo consider it
fair to suggest that: at least some of this constantly repeated
argument is not calculated to persuade you of the \iltimate
conclusions at which the defense arrives. That objective has failed
too often, Certainlj'" one element of some of the defense argument is
to make your honors believe that the field of belligerent occupation
is one in which there is no chart or con^Dassj that since the field
has offered some complications to the learned jurist, the judicial
function cannot appropriately function; that the law abdicates to
become no law where there arc some refinements of criminal conduct
suscoptiblo of debate; and that even if a defendant is guilty of a
crime, he should be dealt with lightly since at least the Germans did
not take international law as seriously as it turned out to be. In
i
this rebuttal argument wc shall treat these matters briefly. For a
more extended treatment, wc refer your honors to our brief filed
h November 19I48, entitled "Prosecution Brief on the General principlcis
of Lavj- Applicable to Count VI (Plunder and Spoliation)", and to the
decisions of other Nurnbcrg Tribunals, For present purposes our
argument can be divided roughly into four major points:
Bc^iaigorency with Contesting Armies In the Field. The Hague and
Geneva Conventions wore adopted to confine and limit the horrors of
It is strange that tho defense keep trying to make something
else out of tho Hague and Geneva Conventions. For example, the
Hague Convention No,!; of 18 October 1907 (Document No.?'nvi-019) states
in its preamble that while the parties seek "moans to proeervc peace
and prevent armed conflict botv;ecn nations, it is likeivise necessary
8 -
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to boar in mind tho case vihcre the appeal to arms has been brought".
The very title of the convention makes our point clear: "Convention
Respecting the Lavrs and Customs of ITar on Land"- The convention
seeks to govern the conduct of belligerents when there arc still
enemies in the .field. This basic principle is re-emphasized hy the
BiT at page 2$k of the official English text unior a heading entitled:
"The Law Relating to Tar Crimes and Crimes against Humanity".
2. Tho Law Concerning Occupation i:^ there loiter Contesting
Armies in the Field. The HIT stated at page 2l8 of the official
English text: "The countries to which the German Reich unconditionally •
surrendered" have the "undoubted right «•«' to legislate for the
occupied territories". This condition admits of no such restrictions
as tho restrictions imposed upon an occupying povTor during a state
of belligerency. Similarly, Tribunal No.Ill in Case No.Ill (the
Justice Case), after citing numerous authorities on this question,
declared at page 10,620 of tho transcript: "The Four powers are not
now in bolligorGnt occupation or subject to the limitations set forth
in tho rules of land warfare." The lav/- may some day provide that other
powers "than the principal victors may control tho nature of a post
war occupation or that an appropriate international body of many
nations control the nature of a post-v/ar occupation. Indeed, today,
numerous matters directly relating to Germany arc the subject of both
debate and action by va.rious bodies of tho United Nations Organization.
In ansr event, the defense claims that tho limitations upon
bciligeront occupation are liko-wisc applicable to post-vrar occupation
arc based upon a failure to regard the basic differences boto-fccn the
two types of occupation^ It has been traditional for an occupying
power after a complete and final subjugation of its cncmios to seek
reparations for tho injuries suffered during belligerency. The
history following the Franco/prussian v/ar and the First Torld Tar
is in point, of course, in the Second ^Torld war the injuries to
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the occupied countrios c.t the hands of the Gorman and Japanese
aggressors vrere immeasurably greater in both scope and degree than
the sufferings inflicted on occupied countries and the citizens of
occupied countries in other recent v/ars. Any prevcntative or
retributive measures taken by the Allies in the day of reckoning
Td.th the A^is aggressors are not to be confused as a matter of law
with the illegal mcasui-cs of occupation vhich Germany applied and
enforced v/hilst her victiras still fought back to restore their
lands from occupation by the invader» 'Thothcr the measures of
reparation the Allies have taken turn out to be T/isc or unri-sc^
these stops certainly have not been a blow to the conscience of
the civilized world. And if reparations wcro increased a hundred
fold, they would still be but scant reparation for the* damage
inflicted. Moreover, much, if not most, of the acts of Allied
occupation to which defense counsel point are a part of a program
which Y/as calculated to prevent the military revival of the principal
aggressor, Germany. The world has learned from hard lessons much
about the potentialities of this nation which has launched a
number of Yfars against its neighbors in the last century.
It Tfould be particularly unfortunate if aggressors Y/ere led
to believe that international lavf prevented the oxcrcise of
legislative power over a defeated aggressor nation. This would be
to destroy another factor restraining aggressors. Another great
difference between the tvro kinds of occupation, whether wo arc
considering the use of property or the treatment of labor, is the
fact that the use of property and manpoYrer in a post-Yrar occupation
does not make the citizens oftl-^i occupied country feel like traitors.
The reason is that citizens affected know
that their country is no longer at war. There is a significant
difference between the case i^cro German prisoners of vrar still vrork
in France to repair the devastation vfhich Germany v^rought during the
recent vrar and the ease v/hore Germany deported Frenchmen diiring the
war. In the latter case, the French deported laborer knew that the
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armamGnt vrork he furthered for Gormar^ vras a contribution to
Germany's total war econoii^r and hcncc directed against the forces
attempting to restore the independence of Franco.
Necessity" and Changes in the Practices and Usage of
Warfare. It is indeed true that international law with respect to
the usages -and practices in the conduct of war did not become fixed
and final in every respect and for all time after the Hague and
Geneva Conventions v/ero adopted, particularly T-dth respect to the
development and use of more deadly v^oapons in inflicting damage upon
the enemy, ii.erc -:,avo been changes. It is probably beside the point
to mention Tfhich of the more terrible weapons of modGrn v^arfaro vrcro
first oraployed by nations of the i\xis and 7jiiich by nations of the
Allies. But since the defense has raised the point, we need on3y
recall the order in. which events took place - the use of the submarine,
the use of the dive bomber against civilians in Poland, the
unrestricted bombing of Warsaw and Rotterdam, the London blitz - all
these events took place before the Allies replied in kind and
ultimately in full measure. But, in any event, it is principally to-
tho destruction of life and property in modern aerial warfare tb
which the defense counsel point in asserting that Gorman leaders
should not now be held responsible for what thoy did in calm
deliberation to the property and to the people of the countries which
occupied.
Germany / On this subject Dr. Lautcrpacht has wa-itton an article
the British year Book of International Law 19U5, entitled "'phc
Law of Kations and the Punishiiiont of "''riir Grimes". The follc-Ting
quotation is taken from that article. The quotation was incorporated
in the judgraent of Tribunal No.VI in its discussion of the law of
spoliation (Tr., Case No.vi, pp.15710-15730 at page l57?5):
"i;oreovcr, it does not appear that the difficulties
arising out of any uncertainty as to the existing law
have a^direct bearing upon violations of the rules of
war which have provided the impetus for the almost
universal insistonco on the punishment of war crimes.
Acts v^rith regard to which prosecution of individuals
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Tfor war criicos may appear improper oiving to the
disputed nature of the rules in question arise largely
in connection with military, naval and air operations
proper. No such reasonable degree of uncertaeaity
exists as a rule in the matter of misdeeds committed
in the course of military occupation of enemy
territory. Here the unchallenged authority of a
ruthless invader offers opportunities for crimes the
hcinousncss of which is not attenuated by any possible
appeal to railitarj'" necessity, to the uncertainty of the
law, or to the operation of reprisals."
ijQ think that these defendants can find little succor from the
authorities or from the decisions of other Tribunals to sustain their
conclusion that the conduct we charge as criminal is permissible and
legal because in modern vra-rfarc high explosives and aerial
bombardment have boon employed against the civilian population and
the industrial cities of the enemy.
Counsel for the defendant KE.-iRI_. in Doou-'uent Book lA. and B, has
presented documentary excerpts to show that traditional ^^merican
occupation practicos demonstrate the same disregard for law as Nazi
practices. Wo have examined the texts to vfhich defense counsel
have made reference and we have found that the dofonse arguments
are simplj'' gross distortions of the statements of the text. To
illustrate, counsel for KGERNER has quoted one of the docximcnts as
establishing the principle that military necessity overrides all
humane considerations In occupied areas. In fact, the text observed
that military necessity is subject considerations of humanity.
Furthermore, wo suggest that when the Tribunal examines these
documents on American practices as evidence of the international lav:s
of war, it is necessary to distinguish between belligerent
occupation and post-war occupation, to distinguish between manuals
for "Ililitary Govcrrimont" and manuals on the Hague Regulations
(m 27^-10), and to distinguish betv^en tho limited moaning of the
tern "military necessity" in American usago and the all-cr!ibra.cing
contcHt which Gorman counsel put into tho same words, in accordance
with German practices.
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k» The "Tu Quoque" Doctrino. Tho dofenso has gone to great pains
to allege cases Trhere some representative or some agency of one or •
the other of the Allied powers allegedly stepped beyond the
prescribed limits of belligerent occupation before the unconditional
surrender^ But even these assertions arc isolated instances. Thoy
fall very short of sho;'dng a pattern of general conduct which would
indicate that international law has been altered b;-,- custom and usago
with respect to tho conduct uo charge as cririnal. Unless it can be
shorn that the law has changed, it is of course no defonso to say
that someone else has also erred and ccinmittod evil. The doctrine
of "you too" (tu quoquc) stands out sharply in tho law for good
reason. K every criminal could avoid his accounting with society
merely by saying that another is guilty, we -rro^old soon return to tho
law of the junglo - and wo suggest tliat this argui.icnt of the defonso
is but anothor example of tiicir effort to state that there is no
applicable law ifhatsoever. Horcovcr, it is one thing to refer to a
local instancean isolated case. It is another, thing whore the
conduct vfas a part of a s3''stomatic program of pwrsceution and
systematic exploitation ii'd.th no or little regard for the most
elomcntarj^ concepts of decency.
THE RTJIE OF m
Society finds its way tcz/ard the extension of tho rule of
lavf in the dcmcstic field as vroll as in tho field of intorne.tional
law by travelling a troubled road. Tho legal nachincry for bringing
evildoers to account is normally some little way behind the acceptance
by an ovcr-ficlming majority of higher standards of doconcy and human
conduct by which tho lavr grows. But to say that all evildoers are
not brought to bar is not to say that there arc no moral principles
or that there is and should be no law. Tliis is familiar gro\md. The
defense assorts that v/e seek to apply two kinds of international law,
one which is applicable to certain categories of Germans, <and one which
- 13 -
Jj- i v'l -itftrr • 'n- i.
»i
N ,
h".W' •'
AV ;
is applicable to tho citizens of the balance of the connnunity of
nations. This is false.- International lavr is international law
•whether Gorinany, MGrica, tho So-viot Union^ or ary other country-
is in-volvcd. This does mot mco.n the legal maohinory-'" is eithor
universal or perfect. But strides arc being made toward the
perfection and extension of the judicial process in international
lavf. It is quite true that it was tho emphatic reaction of tho
civilized community to the imcomparably shocking travesties of tho
Second world War which led to the establishment of legal mechanisms
to enforce international law as against major Axis offenders a.nd
that those offenders principally have been citizens of -the three
main Axis pcnvcrSj Gormanyj Italy- and Japan, Discussions in the
various bodies of tho United ITations sho^: efforts to attain judicial
as well as other machinery to porfoct the working of internr.tional
laiT. At the beginning of this month the International Court of
Justice at the.Hague opened a case involving a dispute bctv'.'een
Groat Britain and Albania over the sinking of British vessels after
19U5« It is obviqus that international laiT is becoming more and
more extensive in its actual enforcement by thq corarirunity of nations.
The difficulties and the imperfections in the application of
international lavr to concrete situations offer no basis to assert
its non-existence. Concerning the concrete situation before your
honors-j the Tribunal has clear jurisdiction and the machinery for
the enforcement of the law is at hand. In applying the law to the
facts, WG petition the Tribunal that justice be done and right be
vindicated.
- lU -
(fclWv- i
I ,' .
